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Abstract
This article presents Karol Wojtyła’s thinking on consciousness and its possible 
distortion called the ‘emotionalization of consciousness’. In consciousness two 
functions can be distinguished, namely a receptive function and an experiencing/
interiorizing function. When the emotionalization of this dual structure takes place, 
consciousness is weakened in registering emotional facts (in their cognitive aspect) 
as well as in their proper experiencing (i.e. in referring them to the interiority of the 
subject). Wojtyła concentrates on self-knowledge as a power, which can contribute 
to limiting or eliminating the emotionalization of consciousness. However, he does 
not mention how to strengthen self-knowledge and make it more adequate for the job. 
Hence, in the paper, the author underlines the role of understanding and command of 
language, which can make self-knowledge a more efficient tool.
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1. Introduction
Dealing with emotions, especially when they are strong and seem to 
overwhelm us, is a real challenge. It becomes even harder when these emotions 
accompany a moment when we are to make an important decision. Then, we are 
forced to fight as if on two “front lines”: first, to curb our emotions and second, 
to think logically with maximum precision in order to prepare the ground for 
an adequate decision. Over the centuries many thinkers and sages have given 
us various clues and strategies of how to win the day, that is, how to remain 
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rational and steadfast versus irrational and strong emotions. Today, this topic 
is also often undertaken by many scholars, not only because of its importance 
in practical behavior but also because of its significance for the understanding 
of human nature. We are still interested in the sphere of reason and the sphere 
of emotions, and in the relationship between them.
The relation between the human intellect and emotions has been at the center 
of attention for many psychologists as well as philosophers for a long time. 
In the case of the former, the topic has been considered, for example, within 
a series of books written by Daniel Goleman and others, with the telling title 
“Emotional Intelligence”1. In the latter, various philosophers2 including many 
phenomenologists3 entertained a vivid interest in the intersection of these two 
human powers. One of them was Karol Wojtyła (1920–2005). He mastered 
a great deal of phenomenology although his analyses on the human being 
cannot be entirely limited to this philosophical approach. He should be rather 
classified as a personalist. In his main work of philosophical anthropology, the 
Polish philosopher took up the relation between consciousness and emotions. 
Let us treat consciousness as one of the instantiantions of the intellect and 
reason. Wojtyła gives some scholarly attention to the influence of emotions 
on consciousness, and in doing so he is far from underestimating the positive 
role of the emotions in the life of the person. But he is also aware that at times 
emotions are able not only to modify positively (e.g. empower) the activity of 
consciousness but also to deform it. In this sense, they do not play a creative role 
in the scheme of personal existence and even interfere in personal fulfillment. 
1  D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ, New York 2005; 
D. Goleman, Working with Emotional Intelligence, New York 2000; L. Lantieri, Building Emotional 
Intelligence: Practices to Cultivate Inner Strength in Children, Boulder 2008.
2  Many proposals have been put forward by various philosophers to determine this relation. 
Let us only point to one interesting example. Peter Goldie sees emotions strictly intertwined 
with reason. He claims that “feeling towards is thinking of with feeling, so that your emotional 
feelings are directed towards the object of your thought”. P. Goldie, The Emotions. A Philosophical 
Exploration, Oxford 2000, p. 19. Generally literature in this respect is enormous. Let us mention 
several examples: G. Corradi Fiumara, The Mind’s Affective Life. A Psychoanalytic and Philosophical 
Inquiry, Philadelphia 2001; G. F. Schueler, Desire. Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation 
of Action, Cambridge MA 1995; Thinking about Feelings. Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, 
ed. R. C. Solomon, New York 2004.
3  E.g. M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value. A New Attempt 
toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, trans. M. S. Frings, R. L. Funk, Evanston 1973, 
p. 253–264.
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This topic will be the subject of our attention in this paper. We will also be 
concerned with possible remedies for this negative scenario.
2. Consciousness Under the Influence of Emotions
Wojtyła’s understanding of consciousness is very original. He departs from 
the paradigmatic phenomenological stance at issue. Doing this he basically 
disagrees with the thesis that consciousness is an intentional power, let alone 
an autonomous subject. Wojtyła understands it as a passive, or at most, semi-
active power, which is complex in itself and cooperates with knowledge and 
self-knowledge. Consciousness alone has two functions: first, it receives, and 
in a sense, mirrors ideas and information acquired by knowledge and self-
knowledge. The latter are active powers, which are directed toward external, 
as well as internal objects. They also objectify cognitively these objects and 
make them into mental representations, which are subsequently delivered to 
the consciousness. Consciousness mirrors this input, which means it receives 
its content as such and makes it evident for the subject. This is a first step in 
the process of interiorizing and has rather a cognitive character. At the second 
stage, consciousness refers the received content to the inner circle of the self, 
namely the “I”. This mode of operation is usually associated with a set of 
emotional experiences. It means that the received cognitive content referred 
to the “I” gets this or that emotional color or flavor, and helps the person in 
approaching her fullness (it is a kind of ontological coming to be or building 
up of the person)4.
Once it is completed the person possesses not only a new rational idea but it 
also has an emotional and subjective link with it. Moreover, the newly acquired 
object enriches the personal interiority – in a sense it expands the personal “I”. 
The subject then can claim, for instance, that “I” do have it as my personal 
possession and it provides me with an additional space for self-expression. In 
this way we can spell out the aforementioned term “ontological building up 
of the person”. When the whole process is uninterrupted, the emotional color 
of a given content is adequate to its significance and importance. However, 
this sequence of knowing and experiencing can be impaired or distorted. The 
4  These two functions constitute a standard model of consciousness, and it will be referred 
to in this way in subsequent sections of the paper.
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Polish philosopher calls this event ‘the emotionalization of consciousness’. In 
the next section we will turn to this issue. But first some light must be shed on 
a certain fundamental issue, the important of personalism as such.
Now we should delve into Wojtyła’s general understanding of the relation 
between cognition and valuing, which is in some connection with our analyses. 
What is important here is that his stance is typical for a broader personalistic 
approach to the issue. A basic presupposition governing this relation is that there 
is not a sharp distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘value’, or more fundamentally 
– between ‘being’ and ‘good’5. Of course, they are not the same but also they 
are not alien or contrary to one another. However, having said that, we must 
acknowledge that we get acquainted with them and have access to them by 
various human powers and abilities. The mere content of a given fact or object is 
penetrated by an intentional power of knowledge (or self-knowledge), “whereas 
in an emotion we are reacting to a value which we find in that object”6. The 
Polish philosopher points out that these activities of knowledge and emotions 
complement each other and even are inseparable (we will elaborate on this 
later). Hence his explanation, “for we must take into account the fact that the 
different objects which we encounter in our sensory experience impinge on 
our attention not only as having content but as having value”7.
Let us assume that whenever we face an object of whatever kind, we acquire 
the data about it. But let us treat this data broadly, that is, including also a value 
aspect8. Then we can divide that data into the data about facts, data-F, and the 
data about values, data-V. This distinction can help us in our subsequent analyses 
because consciousness has an active participation in this double registering 
of objects, including inner ones, that is, states and experiences taking place 
within the human person alone.
5  In a discussion on the priority of ‘good’ vs. ‘value’, or vice versa, the Polish philosopher puts 
the category of ‘good’ as a starting point. ‘Value’, engaging a subject and her experiences, is a way 
of carrying out the ‘good’. See K. Wojtyła, Elementarz etyczny, Lublin 1999, p. 66.
6  K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts, San Francisco 1981, p. 102–103.
7  K. Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 103.
8  In a strict sense, the data stems from an empirical experience. In a broader sense, however, it 
also mirrors a moral experience. Of course, this broader grasp may not be widely accepted, especially 
by empirical philosophers. But for the present analyses – conducted within a personalistic stance 
– let us assume this dual structure, namely that the data is made up of an empirical facet as well as 
an axiological one.
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3. Consciousness Overwhelmed by Emotions
Karol Wojtyła considers emotions within his basic distinction, concerning 
all human activity, between happenings and acts. The latter engage the person 
in her full freedom and intentionality, whereas the former just take place in 
the human being. Emotions or emotional facts, as perceived by the Polish 
philosopher, have characters of happenings. Nevertheless, as such they are 
subjects to rational powers, including self-knowledge and consciousness9. They 
also influence these powers depending on various circumstances and factors. 
As far as consciousness is concerned, emotions play a role in reference to both 
of its functions. Emotions interfere in a mirror-like function as well as in an 
interiorizing one. In a basic scenario, consciousness and its accompanying 
powers keep control over emotions. This means that they are objectified by self-
knowledge and, in a sense, put in front of the receptive consciousness and then 
interiorizing one. In this non-problematic scenario, the human being as a rational 
subject keeps a kind of distance from extra-rational factors. Additionally, the 
will also plays an essential role in exerting real control over emotions but we 
are not going to consider this aspect to a large extent in this paper.
The problem begins when consciousness loses its distance from emotional 
facts. The standard model of consciousness is then undergoing a kind of critical 
test. Wojtyła, as we mentioned above, calls this situation ‘the emotionalization 
of consciousness’. It is usually connected with distortions of functions typical 
for subsequent stages of consciousness. Thus, self-knowledge is not able to 
grasp emotional facts in their meaning; the receptive, mirror-like consciousness 
does not mirror these facts as what they are; the interiorizing consciousness 
does not refer their content to the self of the person in an adequate way. This 
breaking down of the structure of consciousness is a direct result of the breaking 
down of self-knowledge. Its inability to grasp rationally the meaning of a given 
emotional fact brings about further stages of consciousness as dysfunctional 
and hence non-constructive for the person.
The center of the problem consists of the collapsing of self-knowledge. As 
Wojtyła put it, “the breaking down of the objective relation of consciousness 
to feelings, as they “are happening” in the human being (…), comes from the 
9  In this sense, we cannot treat emotion as a kind of “surd” or an irrational event. Although it 
has its own source, for Wojtyła emotion or a whole sphere of emotions is in a relation to the mind, 
that is, it can be grasped by self-knowledge and mirrored by consciousness. I will elaborate on this 
topic below.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 5 (2015) Number 2, p. 149–164154
fact that self-knowledge stops objectifying. It does not establish meaning and 
as a result, it does not hold emotions in intellectual dependency”10. We can ask 
why self-knowledge stops carrying out its vital function. The Polish philosopher 
offers two explanations. First, self-knowledge can be overwhelmed by a power 
of an ongoing emotional fact. This can be the case when external factors are 
so strong and compelling that they cause a state of shock in the human subject. 
Or the subject is oversensitive and prone to experience feelings very intensely 
and disproportionately. Second, self-knowledge is not competent enough to 
cope with emotional pressure and can easily undergo a kind of dysfunction.
Wojtyła claims that self-knowledge plays an essential role in the emotionalization 
of consciousness because only this cognitive power can be more or less developed 
in its activity. Consciousness itself – as he points out – can be, at most, more or 
less mature11. Self-knowledge is, then, the main factor responsible for objectifying 
any emotional facts. In a normal course of action (in the standard model of 
consciousness), a subject is in possession of cognitive premises and abilities 
to control them. Those emotional occurrences are made into known facts and 
so become adequate for the human being as a rational creature. Of course, it is 
not equivalent to full control over the emotions, because, as a philosopher put 
it, “emotions are somewhat recalcitrant to reason”12. Hence – as was mentioned 
above – real control over them cannot be exerted without the active engagement 
of the will13. Nevertheless, if we accept the presupposition that an act of the will 
must be adequately informed in order to initiate a typically human action (the 
act) toward a given fact, the process of objectifying of the fact is the first step 
in exerting real control over it. The above mentioned concept of “intellectual 
dependency” must be construed this way.
Now let us look at the process of the emotionalization of consciousness in 
some detail. It will help us to realize how the standard model of consciousness 
is made dysfunctional. Let us consider the influence of emotional facts on two 
10  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, in K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, 
Lublin 1994, p. 102. The English edition of this book is The Acting Person, trans. A. Potocki, A-Th. 
Tymieniecka, Boston 1979. All quotations are taken from the Polish version and translated by the 
author of the paper.
11  This distinction is in fact discrimination between a fully active power of self-knowledge and 
a semi-active power of consciousness.
12  P. S. Greenspan, Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body, in Philosophy and the Emotions, 
ed. A. Hatzimoysis, Cambridge 2003, p. 115.
13  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 102–103.
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essential functions of consciousness. When we take into account the receptive 
and mirror-like function, we realize that the pressure of emotional facts – which 
crosses a threshold typical for a mature and balanced individual – makes 
consciousness weaker in its natural role. It reflects those facts as something, 
which happens in a subject, but a link with the self is lost or substantially 
weakened. It is thus, because when a subject keeps control over emotions, 
she experiences them as her own feelings, as happenings belonging to herself 
and having a common ground in her being. In this way, the human being is 
able to discern both their cognitive unity and diversity: they have something 
in common with each other, but at the same time they differ. Thus, due to an 
existing link with a subject, emotional facts can somehow be identified. This 
advantage is lost once self-knowledge stops objectifying and grasping the 
particular meanings of those facts. They are mirrored by the first instance of 
consciousness but without cognitive control over them, that is without a full 
realization of what they are.
The second function of consciousness is also influenced by this process. As 
at the previous stage, we face the emotionalization of cognitive mirroring: thus 
at this stage we are before the emotionalization of experience. In other words, 
the emotionalization of experience concerns how the flow of strong emotions 
distorts the emotional reception of any given data breaking the natural rhythm 
of experiencing it. This results in a kind of emotional overpowering. Emotional 
facts function in the person semi-autonomously. In other words, there is a slight 
link between them and the subject. The person is the arena for them, however, 
her involvement in what is going on is minimal. Loss of control over emotions 
leads to experiencing them as raw and primitive facts. Wojtyła underlines that 
such emotional facts are experienced in a heteronomous and non-personal way14. 
It is, as if they were taking place next to the person but not in the person itself. 
We will elaborate more on this later on.
This is, of course, a situation which does not live up to the status of the 
person. In other words, the person participates in something, which is “below” 
her dignity. The Polish philosopher is convinced it is thus because any experience 
entertained by the human being, in order to live up to the requirements of 
personhood, must be unified with her to such an extent that it clearly contains 
the experience of her subjectivity. As Wojtyła points out, “adequate to the 
14  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 104.
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person is this experience, within which the experience of the subjectivity of 
her own “I” can be marked out”15.
The emotionalization of experience is quite disadvantageous for the person 
and the person’s life. Wojtyla observes that an “invasion of emotions” weakens 
the human subject because it loses some control over an essential set of feelings. 
It is like giving way to strong factors, which dominate not only the thinking 
but also the experience of personal integrity and identity. The philosopher is 
convinced that the “I” plays a central role in all acts of the subject, including 
the emotional ones, and the ordinary course of the subject’s life revolve around 
that center16. It means that the “I” is not only a final destination of these various 
factors but also present in all of them. Hence – as we mentioned above – adequate 
experiencing of an emotional fact has as its constituent the experiencing of the 
subject. When the power of emotions is overwhelming, the “I” is put aside, 
and, so to speak, removed from the center of what is going on. She can only 
“observe” the set of happenings as if from outside. Wojtyła describes it in this 
way, “the human being (…) only lives with her emotions, allows them to live 
in her according to the measure of their primitive subjectivity. However, she 
does not live them out subjectively in such a way, that in this experience the 
personal “I”, as the authentic center of experience, was highlighted”17.
Remarks presented by Wojtyła are based on the presupposition – mentioned 
above – that all experiences given to the person must be referred to the 
personal center of her being. Only then are they made into a real part of her 
life. Of course, questions arise in this context: are personally experienced 
emotions parts of personhood or personality? Or, in other words, do human 
beings become more mature persons or personalities after a series of properly 
experienced feelings? It seems that the Polish philosopher does not delve into 
such a distinction. He seems to adhere to the thesis that current experiences 
grasped by self-knowledge, the mirror-like and the experiencing/interiorizing 
consciousness lead to the fuller maturity of the whole interiority of the person 
(including her psyche, mind, conscience, etc.).
15  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 104.
16  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 104.
17  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 104.
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4. Self-knowledge in Its Operations
The emotionalization of consciousness can be avoided in various ways. It can 
be a job for the psychologist who helps a given person to control her emotions. 
Consequently, it will be the task of that person to work on her emotions and 
not let them dominate her cognitive abilities. But Wojtyła, in dealing with the 
emotionalization of consciousness, goes the other way. He does not put the 
emphasis on the psychological side but rather on the philosophical one. He points 
to self-knowledge as a tool in preventing the emotionalization of consciousness 
scenario. It is worth mentioning that the discussion about self-knowledge has 
had a long tradition. It started in ancient philosophy but since the beginning 
of modern philosophy self-knowledge, its acquisition and its extent, has been 
keeping a special position in epistemological investigations. In contemporary 
philosophy it has different faces, including a discussion between the rationalistic 
and the empirical approach so as a more reliable tool of its acquisition18. However, 
we are not going in this direction with our analyses and hence we limit our 
analyses to a range of interest entertained by the Polish philosopher. Thus, let 
us now look closely at Wojtyła’s understanding of self-knowledge in order to 
find some clues concerning how to make it stronger and more adequate.
Self-knowledge is the active power of the person. As we mentioned already, 
it embraces cognitively some essential elements like the person, her “I”, her acts 
and actions, including emotional facts, consciousness of these acts as well as 
consciousness of the person herself, and makes them into objects of cognition. 
Self-knowledge accompanies the “I”, made into an object of cognition, in all 
circumstances where it operates. As Wojtyła puts it, “self-knowledge centered 
on the own “I” as her proper object, goes with it into all domains in which this 
own “I” permeates”19. Self-knowledge carries out an objectification of these 
domains but not for the sake of themselves. It is done only for the sake of the 
own “I”. Because the “I” is understood as multi-dimensional, the “regions” it can 
possibly enter are many. Consequently, self-knowledge acquires an opportunity 
to penetrate them and gain some data about them, but always the data with 
a strict reference to the “I”. The Polish philosopher gives us some examples of 
such specific self-knowledge: moral self-knowledge, religious self-knowledge, 
18  See e.g. B. Gertler, Self-knowledge, New York 2011.
19  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 88.
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and social self-knowledge20. Following these examples, we can add additional 
variations, such as, scientific self-knowledge, cultural self-knowledge, and 
historical self-knowledge, to name only a few.
Wojtyła stresses the fact that self-knowledge aims at one’s own, particular 
“I”. This is the proper object of the cognitive power. However, the Polish 
philosopher is aware that self-knowledge remains the proper knowledge all 
the time. This means that it naturally tends to “work out” the integral picture 
of the person. It is not a power overwhelmed and limited by varieties of 
particulars taking place in the person. Self-knowledge always tends toward 
general concepts. Of course, such generalities concern this particular person 
and are basically known to her alone. Wojtyła gives us two examples of such 
generalities, pointing to the general view of self and a moral assessment of self. 
Self-knowledge is then equally concerned with a cognitive aspect of the “I” 
as well as with its axiological facet21. As we earlier noticed, the data-F always 
accompanies the data-V so, and at the end, they contribute to various aspects 
of a picture of the same person.
The Polish philosopher goes further with the characterization of self-
knowledge. The person is the main object of this cognitive power, although 
the power itself draws upon the personal experiences of a given individual. 
As he puts it, “a whole cognitive work goes exclusively from self-experience 
to self-understanding”22. The person is first an object of experience and only 
later an object of knowledge. What is the role of general knowledge of the 
human being in this scheme? Wojtyła notices that there is a passage from an 
outer knowledge of the person to an inner knowledge. “Self-knowledge uses 
the knowledge about the human being, i.e. various views of the human being 
as well as the knowledge gained from experienced relationships with other 
people, in order to understand better her own ‘I’”23. Nevertheless, this outer 
knowledge is, all the time, an additional and a helpful tool only. Self-knowledge 
is not directed toward the human being as such, but to this particular person: 
so any general understanding of the former plays its role only when it sheds 
some light on the latter.
20  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 88.
21  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 88–89.
22  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 89.
23  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 89.
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5. Self-knowledge as the Guardian of Consciousness
Wojtyła is aware that self-knowledge determines the boundaries of consciousness. 
As we pointed out above, consciousness is not an autonomous subject creating 
its own content. It is not an intentional power going out to things, including 
the person itself, and capturing new essences. Consciousness is exclusively 
“fueled” and “equipped” by knowledge and self-knowledge. This dependency 
leads to two consequences. First, self-knowledge establishes the boundary 
line for consciousness. The latter works exclusively on the data delivered by 
the former, including the data-F and the data-V. As Wojtyła observes, this fact 
helps to secure a realistic profile of consciousness: it is always centered on 
the ‘being’ (and the ‘good’)24. In other words, consciousness is not left alone 
as a ‘producer’ of its own content. Second, however, consciousness can be 
easily deformed by a wrongly operating self-knowledge. And this is the case 
in the emotionalization of consciousness. Thus self-knowledge plays quite 
a fundamental and essential role. Strengthening it and making more adequate 
can substantially strengthen the person in her vital operations.
It seems that there are two ways of doing this: the first we can call “internal”, 
and the second – “external”. The former concerns the “natural” path that self-
knowledge follows. As mentioned already presenting the standard model of 
consciousness, it is directed to objectify the person and everything taking 
place in her. Looking chronologically, self-knowledge intentionally captures 
all acts of the person as well as happenings, including emotional facts. Then, it 
converts them into pieces of information (although value-laden), which are in 
turn delivered to the mirror-like consciousness. When that bit of information 
is received and “absorbed” by the second function of consciousness, namely 
the experiencing/interiorizing one, it is introduced into the circle of personal 
life – enriching and expanding it. But the result of this process is again made 
into a subject of self-knowledge. In other words, self-knowledge is concerned 
not only with the “input” but also with the “output” of consciousness. If it is 
thus, then it brings with it some important consequences.
Self-knowledge should become mature and more adequate by itself. Comparing 
the input with the output should be very instructive for its operations. The quality 
of the output of consciousness is vitally dependent on the quality of its input. 
Poor output should work as a stimulus for the whole cognitive power and should 
24  K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, p. 86.
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result in a better approach to the process of acquiring knowledge, which, in 
turn, would lead to an improved quality of a new input. Self-knowledge should 
correct itself in order to be more efficient and in this way become enhanced 
by its very functions all the time. It also seems that self-knowledge has an “in-
built” function of reflexivity, that is, it can make its own mode of operation into 
an object of cognition. Hence, this power can follow reflexively its own way 
of intentional going out to an object, its objectification and a final deliverance 
of the data to the threshold of consciousness. This, additionally, should be 
helpful in correcting and amending its manner of acquiring the data. But if 
self-knowledge does not improve itself by itself, or when this improvement is 
poor, what can we do?
We can observe, from time to time, that there are some individuals who do 
not improve substantially the level of their self-knowledge. At least, we can 
infer this from their external behavior. What can we propose in order to bring 
them some help? Can we suggest to be more introspective, more attentive to 
all acts and happenings taking place in their person, or maybe something else? 
The problem is how to improve the process of objectifying the facts and in this 
way to make it more acute, sharp and precise. The solution proposed here is 
to put an emphasis on the use of language25. Self-knowledge seems to be more 
efficient if it is able to name adequately captured internal objects. If a person 
possesses a large vocabulary and has a good understanding of it and also 
masters all the other aspects of language (i.e. grammar, practical usage), there 
is a greater chance to formulate just categories for various internal experiences. 
These categories, of course, include not only particular words but also whole 
expressions and even elaborated narratives, because emotional facts can be quite 
complex and not easy to express in simple propositions. A good command of 
language, as a whole structure, can bring with it the powerful help in the process 
of objectifying internal and subjective experiences. Powerlessness, or a lack of 
sophistication in this respect, results in imprecise or faulty data delivered to 
25  This proposal can be a part of the stance called “the language-reality problem.” It essentially 
deals with the dilemma as to whether or not we have access to objective knowledge about existing 
reality. What is important for our investigation is a conviction that “the expression language-reality 
problem is used on the assumption that there is no knowledge of essential importance for this 
problem which for various reasons cannot be expressed by means of language.” See N. O. Bernsen, 
Knowledge. A Treatise on Our Cognitive Situation, trans. H. Vohtz, Odense 1978, p. 117. In the case 
of Karol Wojtyła we have language-reality realism (as opposed to language-reality idealism), namely 
a position advocating for a thesis that we do have objective knowledge concerning existing reality.
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the consciousness. At any rate, the internal data is of high quality and seems 
to be ready for further operations when it is adequately linguistically grasped.
The external way of improving self-knowledge hinges on acquiring knowledge 
in the various contexts and circumstances externally related to the “I”. As we 
mentioned above, self-knowledge goes with the “I” to all domains and regions 
where the latter operates or is influenced. We pointed to various versions of 
self-knowledge as the result of the presence of the “I” in different contexts 
and dimensions. Thus the human subject can acquire some specific knowledge 
when entering into the sphere of morality, religion, social interactions, culture, 
scientific or historical circles. Cognitive familiarity with these domains can 
deliver specific insights and, connected with them, opportunities for the “I” 
to realize that it lives and develops in specific circumstances and is, to some 
extent, conditioned by external factors.
Of course, a mere study of these external domains can be done in a very 
objective way, that is, for the sake of acquiring pure knowledge. Hence something 
more is needed here, namely a steady attempt to refer this knowledge to the 
process of self-understanding. Only then can we not only realize various 
contexts of our existence but also perceive ourselves as if from outside26. This 
proposed attitude is a combination of being itself and looking at itself as if 
through the prism of otherness. As a result it leads to strengthening itself by 
a confrontation with that which is not itself. Assuming that the ‘I’ tends to a kind 
of self-preservation, we have always the same ‘I’ looking from a numerical point 
of view but a modified one looking from a qualitative point of view. A new 
knowledge modifies our ‘self’, the ‘I’ but does not change it substantially. At 
any rate, the more knowledge in these particular spheres and dimensions is 
learnt by the person and referred to herself (i.e. to her interiority), the more 
mature self-knowledge should be. Acquiring knowledge means, to a great 
extent, to learn a new specific language. Thus linguistic abilities can expand 
potentialities of self-knowledge from the outside but also, after a process of 
internalization, from inside27.
26  Even psychologists point in this direction claiming that looking at myself from an external 
perspective, that is, through someone else’s eyes, can be a fruitful way of increasing my self-knowledge. 
See T. D. Wilson, E. W. Dunn, Self-knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement, 
“Annual Review of Psychology”, vol. 55 (2004), p. 507ff.
27  In Wojtyła’s works we can also find other clues about how to make self-knowledge stronger 
and more adequate. One of them concerns art and especially poetry. The Polish philosopher himself 
was a poet and appreciated a role of poetic language in naming the internal states experienced by 
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6. Conclusions
The emotionalization of consciousness is a negative phenomenon for the 
person. Wojtyła describes such a scenario as a distortion of the process of human 
cognition. His attention in reversing the emotionalization of consciousness is 
directed to self-knowledge and its role in this process. At the same time he is 
aware that other powers must be actively employed, like a strong will, in order 
to contain the excessive influence of emotions on consciousness. He does not 
elaborate on this aspect, limiting his analyses to the intellectual factor in dealing 
with emotions. The term “intellectual dependency” concerning the relation 
between mind and emotions draws the line of his interests. At the same time 
it touches on the core of the problem of the emotionalization of consciousness. 
Wojtyła, following Aristotle, is convinced that the mind plays a major role in 
the life and activity of the human being. The person is foremost an animal 
rationale. As mentioned above, it does not mean that other powers, including 
emotions, are less important. Nevertheless, in order to live them out in a really 
human way they are to be put in strict relation to the mind.
Wojtyła’s suggestion of how to avoid the emotionalization of consciousness 
arises then from the idea of the strengthening of rational powers. In his writings, 
however, we are put before the problem but not offered its solution. The only 
thing we are given is a direction of approach. Thanks to this we are prompted 
to further investigation and can exercise various strategies, which subsequently 
can become a part of a broader philosophical picture. At any rate, over the 
history of philosophy many thinkers and philosophers have offered various 
proposals and methods of improving self-knowledge because since Socrates 
(“know thyself”) the issue has been at the center of attention.
Our proposal supplementing this lack is a turn toward language. It indeed 
plays an essential role in acquiring new knowledge, including self-knowledge. 
Thus three aspects of the theory of language seem to be important for our 
investigation: sematic, syntactic and pragmatic one. An ability to name 
properly the internal states of the person hinges on a wide knowledge and good 
understanding of vocabulary, grammar and a practical usage of the language. 
Further elaboration on the struggle with the emotionalization of consciousness 
the person. Thus a relationship between Wojtyła’s poems and their cognitive role, and the concept 
of self-knowledge is worthy of further investigation.
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must show how a good mastery of these aspects of language can contribute to 
a positive outcome.
Philosophical studies on language are very advanced and complex. Here 
we cannot delve into the huge body of literature concerning this field. Let us 
point to at least one direction of further analyses. We can reflect on some basic 
understandings of the aspects of language taking into account their selected 
definitions. Following Mark Platts, a task of semantics can be presented in the 
following way: “A theory of meaning for a language should be able to tell us 
the meaning of the words and sentences which comprise that language”28. Or we 
can define it (as it was traditionally done) as an area “concerned with certain 
relations between words and the world”, where the category of truth plays an 
important role. Pragmatics we can sketch as Donald Kalish did: “The study 
of properties of words which depend on their having been spoken, or reacted 
to, in a certain way, or in certain conditions, or in the way, or conditions, 
they were”29. These selected definitions are made up of elements (meaning, 
properties, relation between words and the world, the truth), which make 
parts of contemporary philosophical debates; in a sense they are at the heart of 
contemporary philosophy. If language is to strengthen self-knowledge, we must 
take into account all of these particular issues in two important areas. Because 
consciousness is concerned both with the data-F and the data-V, the work on 
language should be pursued simultaneously in two fields: epistemological and 
ethical.
Thus we can present two final conclusions. First, a real attempt at improving 
self-knowledge sends us back to theoretical philosophy. An increasing awareness 
on how language works, in various dimensions, can bring us great help in knowing 
ourselves better. Second, working on self-knowledge leads the person from 
her interiority to exteriority: to the encounter with objects, persons, and ideas 
worked out in inter-subjective exchanges; and only then back again. Generally, 
the “I” who encountered and passed through “alien fields” has a greater chance 
to discover and sustain her identity, namely that among other existing things 
and elements I am a separate entity but, at the same time, I am in some relation 
to them and can understand myself better only with their help. In particular, 
this identity depends on such factors as ideas, reasons, emotions and values. 
28  Ch. Travis, Pragmatics, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, eds. B. Hale, 
C. Wright, Oxford 1997, p. 87.
29  Ch. Travis, Pragmatics, p. 87.
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They must interact among themselves in an ordered and harmonious manner. 
It is only a case when we exclude extreme dominance and the disproportional 
role each of them can possibly play. Hence, struggle with the emotionalization 
of consciousness is a really vital task.
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